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dc.contributor.authorMcCluskey, Martha T.
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-15T20:56:22Z
dc.date.available2015-06-15T20:56:22Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationMartha T. McCluskey, Defending and Developing Critical Feminist Theory as Law Leans Rightward, in Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and Legal Theory 352 (Martha Albertson Fineman, ed., 2011)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10477/34270
dc.description.abstractAs part of an anthology marking twenty-five years of the Feminism and Legal Theory Project, this essay explores how the rise feminism in law has been accompanied by the simultaneous rise in rightward leaning legal theory and practice. I argue that a critical approach to feminist legal theory is particularly important to engaging and countering the influence of this rightward, often anti-feminist approach to law. I explain how critical analysis upended the double bind of the equal treatment – special treatment debate in earlier years of feminist jurisprudence, leading to a deeper feminist analysis of the extent to which formal equality always rests on implicit substantive ideas of equality. But as that critique helped open the door to fresh discussions of how gender equality could be given meaningful substance, right wing legal theory advanced a two-prong ideological challenge to feminist equality ideals. One prong used seemingly objective economics to challenge substantive equality; the other prong focused on moral arguments against substantive equality. As with the early equal treatment – special treatment dilemma, each of these ideological attacks constructs a double bind for feminist visions of equality, making the choice for equality appear to be a choice ultimately leading to inequality. I show how critical feminist theory can respond to those challenges by uncovering the double standards of economics and morality that underlie these arguments. Further, I show how the rise of right wing law has posed not just ideological but material challenges to feminist legal theory, by changing the institutions of legal academia to make feminist scholarship more difficult. I suggest that these material challenges also underscore the value of a critical approach that challenges the division between theory and practice as well as the structural and political nature of legal theory.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherRoutledgeen_US
dc.subjectjurisprudenceen_US
dc.subjectfeminismen_US
dc.subjectfeminist jurisprudenceen_US
dc.subjectfeminist legal theoryen_US
dc.subjectLaw and Economicsen_US
dc.subjectcritical legal studiesen_US
dc.subjectcritical theoryen_US
dc.subjectequal treatmenten_US
dc.subjectspecial treatmenten_US
dc.subjectequalityen_US
dc.subjectformal equalityen_US
dc.subjectsubstantive equalityen_US
dc.subjectlegal educationen_US
dc.subjectlegal theoryen_US
dc.subjectidentityen_US
dc.subjectpolitics of lawen_US
dc.subjectlibertarianen_US
dc.titleDefending and Developing Critical Feminist Theory as Law Leans Rightwarden_US
dc.typeBook chapteren_US


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