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Just like any other theory of reference, this paper is primarily aimed to provide the right picture of how we manage to refer to an object in the use of words. My approach is based on the insight from speech-act theorists that a word or expression is taken to refer to an object due to the fact that we refer to the object in using the word or expression. That the word refers to the object makes sense only derivatively from the fact that we use the word to refer to it. The speech act of referring then underlies the semantic concept of reference. The act of referring is at the same time a meaning act though the act of meaning is not always a referring act. When we use a word or expression to refer to an object, we also mean something in using it. That the word or expression used to refer to an abject has its own meaning also makes sense only derivatively from the fact that we use the word or expression to mean something while referring to the object. The meaning act of referring also lies in the foundation of the semantic concept of meaning of expressions used to refer. By analyzing the meaning act of referring itself and its connection to other kinds of meaning acts such as predicating or illocutionary force-indicating (or force-taking), I intend to draw an adequate picture of the semantic concepts of reference, meaning, and their relatives. I also intend to provide proper solutions to some relevant philosophical problems and some well-known philosophical puzzles on the basis of the picture drawn.