Revenue management for online advertising services
Ahmed, Md. Tanveer
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This thesis consists of three separate pieces of work, all of which are related to revenue management of online display advertising services which uses impression based pricing scheme. The first part of this work involves a quantity management and structural decision where we study optimal contract problems for online display advertisements with pay-per-view pricing scheme. In this model, pricing is considered to be exogenous and the publisher needs to decide on contract sizing. We first provide and analyze a single contract model, which is similar to the newsvendor problem. A stochastic optimization problem with two different contracts is considered. We also revisit the problem introducing downside risk-constraint. In the second part, we consider online display advertisement publishers who maximize the revenue by optimizing pricing in an n-player non-cooperative competitive setting. In this oligopoly, each publisher interacts with others though setting cost-per-impression (CPM) that affects the demand for everyone. In essence, the second problem falls in the domain of pricing and quantity decision problem in revenue management. The last problem falls into the category of (allocation) structural decision where an advertiser with a specific budget for online display advertising is considered. The advertiser has three allocation rules to allocate the budget between two online display advertising publishers. She needs to specify allocation rules, among three rule that results in maximum benefit.