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dc.contributor.authorCross, Donald
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-23T20:19:31Z
dc.date.available2018-05-23T20:19:31Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.isbn9781369592931
dc.identifier.other1877631362
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10477/77461
dc.description.abstractChapter 1, “Style and Error,” presents the matrix that subsequent chapters substantiate and support. In his eulogy for Deleuze (1995), Derrida confides that he and Deleuze share a “nearly total affinity.” This affinity is closest with respect to the notion of originary difference, that is, a notion of difference that cannot be reduced to a modification of identity or sameness. In their early work, from Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and Difference and Repetition (1968) to Derrida’s Writing and Difference (1967) and Margins of Philosophy (1972), Deleuze and Derrida repeatedly cite each other when reclaiming the difference that philosophy traditionally suppresses. Yet, if their affinity is “nearly total,” then there is a division between them that “nearly” does not exist. While Deleuze attempts to grasp “pure” difference, difference “itself” or “in itself,” Derrida argues that it is impossible to grasp difference “in itself” precisely because it lacks the identity necessary to become a stable object of study. Deleuze and Derrida agree that subordinating difference to identity would be an “error,” but Deleuze attempts to eradicate the “error” by grasping difference in its “purity,” while Derrida argues that such “error” is always possible. The following chapters develop this divided perspective on originary difference through the notion of style. Chapters 2 and 3 attempt to understand why Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy from what they call the “point of nonstyle” on the first page of What Is Philosophy? . Rather than philosophy in general, however, Deleuze and Guattari seek to define what they in particular have done as philosophy. Accordingly, chapter 2 focuses on the specificity of the philosophy that Deleuze claims to do for the first time in Difference and Repetition (1967), while chapter 3 focuses on philosophy as Deleuze and Guattari define it in What Is Philosophy? (1991). In addition to establishing that the philosophy “defined” in What Is Philosophy? resumes the philosophy of difference “done” in Difference and Repetition , my agenda is twofold. First, chapter 2 argues that the philosophy cannot grasp difference purely because its culminating moments – thinking and the future – are always haunted by an anticipation of the forms of identity that ruin it. Second, chapter 3 argues that philosophy cannot rigorously create concepts from the point of nonstyle because nonstyle is inseparable from another style, a “major” style, a traditional style that deadens conceptual novelty in advance. Chapter 4, “The Work of Deconstruction, Its ‘Style,’” analyzes the recourse to style in what Derrida calls “deconstruction.” For Derrida, as for Deleuze, style is a question a difference. Derrida, however, never relates style to “pure” difference. “Pure” difference, for reasons Derrida explains often and at length, is inconceivable and unseizable. Hence, deconstruction reworks the resources of the tradition in order to develop a notion of originary difference. More specifically, deconstruction works within the traditional style of philosophy in order to reveal that other styles are also at work. For the same reason, however, Derrida already prophesizes in the Grammatology (1967) that the “style” of deconstruction is fundamentally open to misinterpretation as a mere repetition of the tradition that it critiques. Deconstruction, in other words, risks the very “error” that Deleuze seeks to abolish by grasping difference in its “purity.” After developing what relates “style” to “difference” in Deleuze and in Derrida respectively, Chapter 5 – “Code, Coda, Style: Cerisy-la-Salle 1972” – brings them together. Their relation to difference, to style, and to each other comes to a head at a ten-day conference dedicated to the question of Nietzsche aujourd’hui? Not only do Deleuze and Derrida both address style. They share a thesis: Nietzsche mobilizes style to prevent any definitive or exhaustive interpretation of his texts. Their claims, however, differ in at least one aspect. Whereas Deleuze argues for what he calls “absolute decodification” in Nietzsche’s text as an uncompromising resistance to any final interpretation, Derrida argues that one cannot prevent the illusion of a definitive interpretation, that is, one can never decode “absolutely.” In other words, one cannot prevent style from “erring.” While the first chapters are dedicated to style as a philosophical problem, the last chapter, “Archaizing Style,” develops the consequences of style’s relation to difference for literary criticism through a reading of Borges’s “Pierre Menard.” According to the story’s narrator, Cervantes and Menard write the “same” story. The story is the same in every respect except with respect to style. The same story therefore has more than one style, and one can never be certain which of two distinct but co-contaminating voices is at work: one named “Cervantes” or the other named “Menard.” One can never be certain, then, that either style exists. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.)
dc.languageEnglish
dc.sourceDissertations & Theses @ SUNY Buffalo,ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global
dc.subjectLanguage, literature and linguistics
dc.subjectPhilosophy, religion and theology
dc.subjectBorges, Jorge Luis
dc.subjectDeleuze,Gilles
dc.subjectDerrida, Jacques
dc.subjectDifference
dc.subjectStyle
dc.titleStyle and difference: Deleuze, Derrida, Borges
dc.typeDissertation/Thesis


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