Input Certification for Secure Computation
MetadataShow full item record
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) allows its participants to securely compute functionality without revealing their private input and has broad application across a diverse spectrum. In general, to prove the security of a cryptographic construction standard security model, one must consider participants as semi-honest or with malicious intent. However, we treat the problem outside of traditional security models even in the presence of malicious participants. We strengthening the security of SMC protocol with the ability to guarantee that the participants provide truthful inputs in the computation. In other words, we focus on enforcing input correctness.To begin this examination, we combine SMC techniques based on secret-sharing with signatures in order to enforce input correctness in the form of certification. We modify two signature schemes, the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya scheme and ElGamal scheme, to achieve private verification and efficiency of batch verification. Consequently, this shows the potential for integration with two prominent SMC protocols. Next, we utilize a certificate issued by a certification authority to verify the user's input correctness and consequently use it in the secure computation. In this work, we treat the enforcing correctness of evaluator's inputs to the two-party computation based on a garbled circuit evaluation in the presence of malicious participants. For the purpose of discourse, we modify the oblivious transfer (OT)/OT extension and construct new protocol with the goal of achieving efficient computation.